Indiana Law Journal
Volume 41

Issue 1

Article 6

Fall 1965

Extrajudicial Criminal Confessions in Indiana: Changes in the Law
of Admissibility

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Evidence Commons

Recommended Citation
(1965) "Extrajudicial Criminal Confessions in Indiana: Changes in the Law of Admissibility," Indiana Law
Journal: Vol. 41 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol41/iss1/6

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
rvaughan@indiana.edu.

EXTRAJUDICIAL CRIMINAL CONFESSIONS IN INDIANA:
CHANGES IN THE LAW OF ADMISSIBILITY
A confession is a statement made by a person charged with the
commission of a crime, communicated to another person, wherein he
acknowledges himself to be guilty of the offense charged and discloses
the circumstances of the act or his degree of participation in it.' The
defendant must do more than make statements which in themselves are
not sufficient to convict him of the crime charged. Such statements are
admissions, not confessions. An admission is a statement by the accused
of pertinent facts tending, in connection with proof of other facts, to
prove his guilt, whereas a confession is an acknowledgement of guilt of
the crime charged. 2 Different rules of evidence are applied to admissibility of confessions and admissions. An admission is admissible in
evidence against the accused even though involuntary, whereas a confession is not. For example, in Watts v. State' the Indiana Supreme
Court ruled that a statement coerced from the accused which divulged
the whereabouts of the murder weapon (a shotgun) was admissible.
The court said: "The fact that the shotgun was found by direction of
the defendant was not in itself a confession of guilt, nor could it, by
itself, establish the defendant's guilt."4 The statement of guilt must be
definite and not conjectural. Where the defendant stated that it was not
anyone's business if they were making home brew, the court held the
statement not to be a confession because of its suppositional character.5
At the time of the making of the confession it is not necessary that
the accused intend to confess or think he is makinig a confession. For
example, testimony given by the accused as a witness in another case or in
a coroner's inquest may be used against him as a confession.6 Confessions
may be either written or oral.7
The law governing the admissibility of confessions has undergone
several stages in its development. Originally, at common law there were
no restrictions upon the admissibility of confessions. They were admitted
in evidence against the accused even though they were obtained from him
by torture, threats, or promises. But in the last half of the eighteenth
1. 3

WIGiXORE, EVmENCE

§ 821 (3rd ed. 1940).

2. 2 WARTON, CRimINAL. EvIDENcE § 337 (12th ed. 1955).

3. 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.F-2d 570 (1950).
4. Id. at 110, 95 N.E.2d at 583.
5. Shepard v. State, 220 Ind. 405, 164 N.E. 276 (1928).
6. Anderson v. State, 26 Ind. 89 (1866) ; Epps v. State, 102 Ind. 539, 1 N.E. 491
(1885).
7. Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d 362 (1954).
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century the courts, believing confessions obtained by such means to be
untrustworthy, developed rules forbidding their use as evidence, and by
the nineteenth century the attitude of the courts had changed. The courts
excluded confessions from evidence upon the slightest pretext.' At the
end of the 1800's there was a swing back to a more liberal attitude
toward the admissibility of confessions. This is basically the rule of
the courts today; however, the pendulum has at least partially swung back
the other way with the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Escobedo v. Illinois,' which held that a confession is inadmissible if the
accused is deprived of his right to the aid of legal counsel even though
the confession is voluntary. The question is how far back the pendulum
has swung.
RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING INVOLUNTARY CONFESSIONS

Involuntary confessions are excluded because their use in evidence
against the accused violates his right to procedural due process under
the fourteenth amendment." It is contrary to justice and due process
of law to allow evidence extracted from the accused against his will
to be used to convict him. There is a combination of reasons why the
Supreme Court has held the use of involuntary confessions constitutes a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. First, the use of such confessions
violates the defendant's right against self-incrimination under the fifth
amendment, which has been incorporated into the fourteenth amendment.
Although no confession has yet been excluded explicitly upon this basis
alone, the accused's right to remain silent which was emphasized in
Escobedo v. Illinois,1 appears to rest upon the right against self-incrimination. The second reason given for the exclusion of involuntary confessions is that they are as likely to be false as true."2 This was the sole
basis at common law for the exclusion of such confessions.1 3 A third
reason for the exclusion of involuntary confessions is to restrain police
investigators from illegal conduct designed to extort confessions.1 4
8. 3

WIGaORE, EVIDENCE § 820 (3d ed. 1940).
9. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
10. Wallace v. State, 235 Ind. 538, 135 N.E2d 512 (1956) quoting from the
language of Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949) said that to turn the detention of the
accused into a process of wrenching from him evidence which could not be extorted in
open court with all its safeguards is so grave an abuse of the power of arrest as to
offend the safeguards of procedural due process.

11. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
12. See, e.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953) ; Lisenba v. California, 314
U.S. 219 (1941).
13. 3 WIGMopF, EVIDENCE § 823 (3d ed. 1940).
14. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). In 338 U.S. at 55 the United States
Supreme Court said: "Under our system, society carries the burden of proving its charge
against the accused not out of his own mouth. It must establish its own case, not by
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The underlying basis under present law for the rejection of involuntary confessions is the inherent unfairness of using against the accused
statements which he has been coerced into making. If the reliability
rationale for excluding confessions were carried to its logical conclusion,
any confession would be admissible if proved true or substantiated
despite the fact that it is not freely given by the accused. This is clearly
not the law. Due to the inherent unfairness to the accused of using a
confession coerced from him, the courts will not allow an involuntary
confession to be introduced in evidence even if proved true.15 Neither
is the fairness concept quite carried to its logical conclusion. Confessions
obtained from the accused by trickery and deceit are generally admissible
if true. However, the United States Supreme Court has given some
indication that it will not uphold such confessions in the future."

THE SUBJECTIVE STANDARD OF VOLUNTARINESS
Involuntary confessions are clearly inadmissible in Indiana by
virtue of the following statute: "The confession of a defendant made
under inducement, with all the circumstances, may be given in evidence
against him, except when made under the influence of fear produced by
threats or by intimidation or undue influence; but a confession made
under inducement is not sufficient to warrant a conviction without corroborating evidence."'"
The requirement for corroborating evidence
merely means that the state must prove that the crime confessed to has
actually been committed. The reason for this requirement is to insure
that no one is convicted upon a false confession.
The early Indiana cases applied an objective test of voluntariness
which did not take into consideration the particular characteristics of
the accused, such as his age, education, race, or mental traits, etc., in
determining his ability to resist police demands." The subjective apinterrogation of the accused, but by evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation." Also in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), the United States
Supreme Court stated in 378 U.S. at 489 that "we have learned the lesson of history,
ancient and modern, that a system of criminal law enforcemcitt which comes to depend
on the confession will, in the long run, be less reliable and m re subject to abuses than
a system which depends on extrinsic evidence independently secured through skillful
investigation."
15. Johnson v. State, 226 Ind. 179, 78 N.E.2d 158 (1943); Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961) ; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
16. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
17. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1607 (Burns 1956). (Emphasis added.)
18. Illustrative of this view of voluntariness in the earlkr cases is Hauk v. State,
148 Ind. 238, 47 N.E. 365 (1897) in which the accused was ar ested for hiring a doctor
to perform an abortion upon his lover who subsequently died. The police threatened to
allow a hostile mob just outside of the jail to seize the acctsed if he did not sign a
confession, and they further informed him that if he did not sig n a confession his mother
and sister would be implicated in the crime and sent to jail. As a result of these pres-
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proach to voluntariness first appeared in Indiana when the United States
Supreme Court reviewed the case of Watts v. State" which involved
intensive, prolonged questioning of the accused by relays of policemen
over a period of five days in connection with a case of rape and murder.
During the five days the accused was questioned continually from 11:30
P.M. until 3:00 A.M., and in the daytime he was driven about Indianapolis. This schedule allowed him little sleep. He was also given insufficient food and was kept in solitary confinement in a place called
the "hole" for two days. After the sixth day, the accused signed a
confession and led police to the murder weapon. The Indiana Supreme
Court upheld the conviction based on this confession.2" The court
apparently adhered to an objective test of voluntariness. The United
States Supreme Court reversed the conviction2' stating in its holding that
"while a statement to be voluntary need not be volunteered, it does not
issue from a free choice if it is a product of a sustained pressure by the
police, it being immaterial whether the accused has been subjected to a
physical or mental ordeal."22
The Court clearly applied a subjective rather than an objective
standard in ascertaining the voluntariness of the confession. After considering the cumulative effect of all the forces bearing on the accused's
freedom of choice to confess, the Court concluded that his confession
was not the product of a free mind even though no force or threats of
force had been exerted upon him. The cumulative effect of prolonged
and relentless interrogation resulting in insufficient sleep, the lack of
adequate food, the two days in solitary confinement, wore down the
accused's will to resist the demands of his interrogators. 2
Although the subjective standard is the basic one for determining
the voluntariness of a confession, there is a cognate test which is applied
sures, the defendant signed a confession upon which he was convicted. The Indiana
Supreme Court upheld the conviction stating that the confession was voluntary because
the threats directed at the accused were not of a nature that would make him state from
fear that which was false.

19. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
20. Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655, 82 N.E.2d 846 (1949).
21. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
22. "Eventual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product
of the suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary. This was
a calculated endeavor to secure a confession through the pressure of unrelenting interrogation. The very relentlessness of the interrogation implies that it is better for the
prisoner to answer than to persist in the refusal of disclosure which is his constitutional
right." Id. at 56.
23. This subjective criteria of voluntariness has been accepted and applied by Indiana courts ever since the Watts case. See, e.g., Sutter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88
N.E.2d 386 (1949); Wallace v. State, 235 Ind. 538, 135 N.E.2d 512 (1956); Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Lisenba v. California, 319 U.S. 221 (1941) for
the application of this test.
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in special circumstances. Where the Supreme Court has found the
conduct of the accused's interrogators inherently coercive, it has held that
the accused's right to due process of law has been violated without examining the subjective effect of the pressures upon the individual accused.
For example, in Ashcraft v. Tennessee" the accused was continually
questioned by relays of police officers for thirty-six hours during which
time he was allowed no rest or sleep. Without considering the actual
reaction of the accused to these pressures the Court held the confession
to be involuntary because of the obvious employment of coercion." The
Court apparently felt that such conduct by police officials would coerce
a confession from any person, regardless of age, intelligence, etc., and
thus believed a subjective consideration of the accused's reaction to be
unnecessary. Under this standard the Court may in exceptional circumstances hold a confession to be involuntary as a matter of law where the
accused's will has not, in fact, been overborne because of his extraordinary
stamina, etc. The real objective of the Court s,'ems to be to deter
flagrant abuses of police whether or not they result in an involuntary
confession."
In Gallegosv. Colorado2" the United States Supreme Court departed
from the voluntary standard in the case of an immature, youthful
offender. The accused, a fourteen-year-old boy, was arrested for murder;
immediately upon arrest he orally confessed to the crime. He was
confined in a juvenile home for five days before he signed a confession.
While there he was allowed to speak freely with the other boys and to eat
his meals with them. Although prior to his confess on he was not taken
before a magistrate nor did he see his parents or an attorney, he was
told before making the written confession that he could confer with his
parents and an attorney. The Supreme Court held the confession to be
inadmissible. Although the language of its decision reversing the conviction in view of the "totality of circumstances" was couched in the
terminology of the subjective test of voluntarines3, apparently a new
24. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
25. "We think a situation such as that shown here is so inherently coercive that
its very existence is irreconcilable with the possession of mntal freedom by a lone
suspect against whom its full coercive force is brought to be~r." Id. at 154. Justice
Jackson criticized the majority for not determining whether 6e confession was in fact
coerced. He objected to the majority's failure to apply the subjective test of voluntariness. Id. at 157 (dissenting opinion).
26. For support of this proposition see, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503
(1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 566 (1958). See, also, Stein v. New York, 346
U.S. 842 (1953) where it was stated by the court that physical violence or the threat
of it invalidates the confession without regard to the actual effect of it on the will of
the accused.
27. 370 U.S. 49 (1962).
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standard was applied. Itis doubtful that the confession in this case was
involuntary under either the subjective or inherently coercive tests since
there was no physical coercion, no intensive questioning, and no psychological threats. The accused freely admitted the absence of any such
factors.28 There were no questionable practices other than the illegal
detention of the accused which under these circumstances was not inherently coercive.
In holding the confession inadmissible the Court emphasized the
fact that the youthful accused was unaware of his constitutional rights.
In the words of the Court, it was dealing with, "a person who is not equal
to the police in knowledge and understanding of the consequences of the
questions and answers being recorded and who is unable to know how to
protect his own interests or how to get the benefits of his constitutional
rights." 9 Although there was no physical or mental coercion indicated by
the evidence, the Court held the defendant's lack of knowledge and appreciation of his constitutional rights to invalidate the confession. This new
standard appears to have been limited to youthful offenders through the
Court's emphasis upon the youth of the accused. However, it would
logically seem to follow that this standard would apply to persons of any
age who are unaware or unappreciative of their right to remain silent and
their right to counsel."
GENERAL STATE OF MIND OF ACCUSED AS AFFECTING APPLICATION
OF SUBJECTIVE TEST OF VOLUNTARINESS

The law presumes that an insane person can commit no rational,
voluntary act; he has no capacity to make a rational decision; nor can he
know of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the confession of an insane
person is a nullity.2 A confession will not be excluded on the sole
ground that the accused is of low emotional or mental stability, feebleminded, or deranged, provided he is capable of understanding the effect
and meaning of his confession. However, the fact that a confession will
not be excluded from evidence solely upon the low mental capacity of
the accused does not mean that the accused's mental state is not considered
in determining whether his confession was voluntary. In applying the
subjective test of voluntariness, the mental state of the accused is an
important factor which is evaluated and weighed with the other circum28.

Id. at 61 (dissenting opinion).

29. Id. at 54.
30. It appears that Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) has produced this
result.
31. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960); People v. Shroyer, 336 Ill. 324,
168 N.E. 336 (1929) ; State v. Campbell, 301 Mo. 618, 257 S.W. 131 (1923).
32. Tipton v. Dickson, 355 U.S. 934 (1958).
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stances present at the time of the confession in order to determine
whether the confession was in reality the product of free choice.
Intoxication of an accused at the time of giving the confession will
preclude it from evidence only if his drunkenness was such as to render
him unaware of the implications of what he was saying or to produce in
him a state of mania. A confession given in a state of intoxication of a
lesser degree is admissible and the jury must consider such intoxication
in ascertaining the weight to be given the confession. If the intoxicated
accused is cognizant of his acts his confession should be admissible provided it is otherwise voluntary. Since the accused has voluntarily put
himself under the influence of alcohol, he should not be allowed to assert
this as invalidating the confession unless he was in such a state of stupor
as to be unable to act wilfully and rationally.
It is entirely consistent with the subjective test of voluntariness to
refuse to exclude a confession on the sole ground of intoxication unless
that intoxication is so extreme as to render the accused unaware of what
he is saying. Although it is not apparent from the above rule, the courts
undoubtedly consider intoxication of a lesser degree in determining
voluntariness in the pre-trial hearing before admitting the confession
to the jury. To be consistent with the subjective test of voluntariness,
intoxication must initially be considered by the judge as one factor in
determining whether the confession was the product of a free mind.
A confession is admissible evidence even though given while the
accused was under the influence of narcotics or drtgs, provided he was
capable of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession, 4 and
provided the drugs did not produce mania. The fact that the accused
was under the influence of drugs at the time of giving the confession
must be considered as one of the factors affecting the voluntary nature
of the confession since they may make him more sasceptible to official
33. Wells v. State, 239 Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256 (1959) ; May v. State, 232 Ind.
F23, 112 N.E.2d 439 (1953) ; Eif fe v. State, 226 Ind. 57, 77 N.X.2d 750 (1948) ; Laugh-

lin v. State, 171 Ind. 6, 84 N.E. 756 (1908).
1940).

3

WIGAORE, EVIDENCE

§ 841(2) (3d ed.

In the Eiffe case, the accused, at the time of the confession, vas nervous from having
be'n drunk the previous day and was suffering from a hangox er. The Court held the

confession to be voluntary.
"Mania" as defined in BLACK, LAw DicrioN.ARn 934 (4th ec.. 1951) is "that form of
insanity in which the patient is subject to hallucinations and illusions, accompanied by a
high state of general mental excitement, sometimes amounting to fury."
34. See, e.g., U.S. ex. rel. Townsend v. Sain, 276 F.2d 324 (C.A. Ill. 1960) ; People
v. Townsend, 11 Ill. 2d 30, 141 N.E2d 729, cert. denied, 355 U S. 850, cert. denied, 358
U.S. 887 (1958). 2 UNDERHILL, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 393 (5th ed. 1956) ; 2 WHIARTON,
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 393 (12th ed. 1955) ; 2 WirmoRE, EVIDE:CE § 499 (3d ed. 1940).
One case has been reported in which a confession was helek inadmissible because of
mania produced by drugs. State v. Anderson, 247 Minn. 469, 78 N.W.2d 320 (1956).
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pressures to confess. Ordinarily it is immaterial whether the drug was
self-administered or given by the police. Even if the drug were administered by the police, the confession should not be inadmissible unless
the drug produced mania or rendered the accused unaware of or incapable
of understanding the meaning and effect of his confession. It is the
effect which the drug produces upon the accused that is the determinative
factor, not by whom it is administered.
An entirely different question is presented where the confession
was given by a defendant while under the influence of a drug having the
effect of a truth serum. Such confessions are clearly inadmissible
whether or not the drug produced mania or the defendant was aware of
his statement. Truth serums may induce the accused to make statements
which he would not voluntarily make if not under the influence of the
drug.3 5 If it were not for the dubious reliability of confessions induced
by the serum, confessions given by the accused while under the influence
of truth serum would probably be considered admissible if he had knowingly consented to the use of such drug upon himself. However, respected
authorities have stated that truth serums occasionally yield a mixture
of truth, fantasy, suggestions, and sometimes lies. 6
Confessions made by the accused under hypnosis present almost
the same situation as that of truth serums. Hypnotism has been defined
as a condition, artificially produced, in which the person hypnotized, apparently asleep, acts in obedience to the will of the operator."' The
hypnotized person is extremely suggestible and usually responds in the
manner indicated by his operator. Such confessions are clearly inadmissible since the accused has no volition of his own, but acts at the demand
of the hypnotist. Confessions given under hypnosis have been defended
on the ground that the hypnotist cannot cause his subject to make false
statements. Whatever the validity of that argument may be, the truth
of the confession is irrelevant since it is not voluntarily given.3"
35. In Townsend v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) where a police psychiatrist injected the accused with scopolamine on the pretext of giving him a pain-relieving drug
to ease the symptoms of withdrawal from heroin, the Supreme Court stated 372 U.S. at
307: "If an individual's 'will was overborne' or if his confession was not 'the product of
These standards
a rational intellect and a free will,' his confession is inadmissible....
are equally applicable to a drug-induced statement. It is difficult to imagine a situation
in which a confession would be less the product of a free intellect, less voluntary, than
when brought about by a drug having the effect of a truth serum . . . whether
scopolamine produces true confessions or false confessions, if it in fact caused Townsend
to make statements, those statements were constitutionally inadmissible."
36. RoHN, PoLIcE DRUGS (1956); MacDonald, Truth Serum, 46 J. CmM. L., C. &
P.S. 259 (1955).
37. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 876 (4th ed. 1951).
38. In Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954) the police brought a psychiatrist to
the accused identifying the former as a doctor who had brought medicine to relieve the
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Negative inducements to confess are inducements such as physical
force executed upon the accused, threats, deprivation of food and sleep,
etc. Undoubtedly, all jurisdictions hold that confessions obtained by such
means are involuntary and thus inadmissible. There is statutory authority
in Indiana prohibiting the use of force or threats of force to obtain
confessions." Confessions obtained in violation of this prohibition are
inadmissible regardless of whether formal charges 1-ad been filed or the
accused was merely being held for investigation.4" Confessions obtained
by force or threats exerted upon the accused are clearly not voluntarily
given.41 A confession is not inadmissible merely because force or threats
occurred prior to or at the time of confession. The force or threats of
force must have been of such a nature and so closely related in time
to the confession that they caused the accused to confess against his will.
Nevertheless it is not necessary that the actual purpose of the threats or
force exerted upon the accused be to obtain a confession.42
Positive inducements are promises of reward, immunity, lighter
punishment, etc. made to the accused in exchange for a confession. The
early Indiana decisions held such confessions admissible. Their position
was one of strict adherence to the letter of the Indiana statute which
allows confessions obtained by promises.43 It specifies that only confessions given under fear shall be excluded. Thus, a confession was
admissible against the accused even though obtained by promissory
defendant's sinus pain. The psychiatrist hypnotized the defendant and obtained a confession from him through suggestive questioning. The United Stites Supreme Court held
Ihe confession to be involuntary.
39. IND. STAT. ANN. § 10-404 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person or
tpeace officer having in custody any person under arrest charged with the commission of
a crime, to inflict upon the person so held any physical violen:e or threaten to inflict
personal violence or deprive him of necessary food or sleep for the purpose of extorting
from said person a confession that he, or some person within h;s knowledge, was guilty
of the violation of some state or municipal law." Also, IND. STA-,.. ANN. § 9-1607 (Burns
1956) provides that confessions obtained by inducements are admissible unless given
under the influence of fear produced by force, threats, or undue influence.
40. Sutter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1950).
41. The inducement statute has been largely replaced b. the subjective test of
%oluntariness which itself makes confessions given under fear inadmissible.
42. In Johnson v. State, 226 Ind. 179, 78 N.E.2d 158 (1948) the accused, who
latally shot an Indiana state trooper, was apprehended in a wooded area by fifteen state
police officers who handcuffed him with his hands behind his b ck and severly beat him
with their fists. Then the accused was driven to state police headquarters where he
confessed after interrogation. The Court held that the confession was inadmissible
because it was obtained by force. The Court stated that it is irrelevant that the beating
inflicted by the police was provoked by anger over the death o" their comrade and not
for the purpose of eliciting a confession. It also noted that the conclusion was inescapable that the confession resulted from the beating because oi the closeness in time
between the two.
43. IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1607 (Burns 1956).
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inducements since it was not the product of fear.44
However, there have been no cases in Indiana in several decades
in which there has been a question of a confession obtained by promises
relating to the charge.4 5 What accounts for the absence of cases involving
confessions obtained by promises relating to the charge? Apparently,
when a confession is obtained by positive inducements the defendant is
willing to receive the benefits of the promise and is reluctant to jeopardize
them by proving that the confession was induced by promises. Since a
plea of guilty will probably accompany the confession, the admissibility
of the confession is not contested.4" Where promises are made, they are
usually attempts to induce the accused's co-defendant to give testimony
against him rather than to obtain a confession from the accused."'
It is unlikely that Indiana would now uphold a confession obtained
by promises. As early as 1884 the United States Supreme Court held that
the use of such confession is violative of the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.4" The invalidity of such confessions has often
been reiterated by the Supreme Court.49 In Haynes v. Washingtoie' the
United States Supreme Court indicated that Washington's statute, which
permits confessions obtained by promises to be used in evidence, was
unconstitutional. The Washington statute involved in Haynes is identical
to Indiana's statute. The judge in the Washington district court instructed the jury in the terms of the inducement statute telling them that
they must find the confession voluntary even though given under induce44. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238 (1897) was typical of these early cases declining
to exclude a confession obtained by promises of benefit relating to the charge. In that
case the defendant had been promised his freedom if he would confess and divulge the
name of his accomplice. Upon the faith of his promise he signed a confession upon
which he was convicted. The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of the confession
because it was not made under the influence of fear.
45. In Brown v. State, 232 Ind. 227, 111 N.E.2d 808 (1953) at the time of the
defendant's arrest for kidnapping, he was also wanted for escape from the state penitentiary. He confessed to the crime of kidnapping upon the faith of promises by the
policemen that he would not be prosecuted for escape from the penitentiary. The confession was held admissible even though obtained by a promise. This decision is not
contrary to the almost universal rule prohibiting the use of confessions obtained by
promises of benefit, since this rule is applicable only to promises which relate to the
charge to which the confession pertains. Here, the promise did not relate to the charge
to which the accused confessed (kidnapping), but it related to a different charge, that
of escape from prison.
46. Mr. Fred Gregory, former Monroe County prosecutor for the State of Indiana,
stated that in his experience he has found that promises are seldom used to obtain a
confession from a defendant. Interview with Mr. Fred Gregory in Bloomington, Indiana, August 4, 1965.
47. Ibid.
48. Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
49. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Ashdown v. Utah, 357
U.S. 426 (1958) ; Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958).
50. 373 U.S. 503 (1963). See also Brown v. Allen, 343 U.S. 433 (1953).
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ments unless made from the influence of fear. In dicta the United States
Supreme Court said: "It seems reasonably clear from this instruction
[based on the statute] that the jury may well have been misled as to the
requisite constitutional standard

.

.

.

the jury may have based its

finding of guilt on the confession, reasoning under the questionable
Washington statute . . .the Washington statute and the quoted instruc-

tion [based upon it] raise a serious and substantial question whether a
proper constitutional standard was applied by the jury."'"
Confessions obtained by promises of benefit are considered to be
inadmissible because they are unreliable. The holding out of sufficient
benefit to the accused may cause him to confess falsely to a crime. If one
is accused of robbery and offered a suspended sentence or a reduction
of the charge to petit larceny as an incentive for his confession, he may
confess, even though he is innocent, rather than ex.pose himself to the
risk of conviction upon the charge of robbery. This was the rationale
for the exclusion of such confessions at common law. 2 Promises of
benefit deprive the confession of its voluntary character; where a confession is induced by promises, it is not the product of free and unconstrained choice.
The only confessions obtained by promises which are inadmissible
are those induced by promises of a temporal nature relating to the charge
to which the confession pertains. 3 The benefit promised must be direct
and not collateral to the charge. 4 For example, where the defendant was
arrested for the commission of two different crimes, escape from prison
and kidnapping, a confession to the crime of kidnapping given in exchange for a promise not to prosecute him for escape from prison was
admissible since the promise did not relate to the charge to which the
confession pertained.
It does not appear that a distinction based upon whether the promised
benefit does or does not relate to the charge is valid. There is no real
difference between the above example and a situation where the accused
is promised a lighter sentence for the crime to which he confesses. In the
above example the charge of escape from prison c.rried a sentence of
seventeen years and the charge of kidnapping was punishable by a ten
year sentence. Thus, there was a potential total sentence of twenty-seven
years. The accused was promised a sentence of ten years instead of
twenty-seven if he confessed to the kidnapping charge. Assuming armed
51. 373 U.S. at 518.
52.
53.
54.
55.

3 WIGMOaR, EVIDENCE § 834-36 (3d ed. 1940).
See Hopt v. Territory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
Annot., 80 A.L.R.2D 1428, 1436 (1961).
Brown v. State, 232 Ind. 227, 111 N.E.2d 808 (1953).
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robbery carries a sentence of twenty-seven years, how does the above
promise differ from one where the accused is promised a sentence of ten
years on the charge of armed robbery instead of the twenty-seven years
if he will confess to that crime? In both instances, the confession is
induced by a promise of a reduction in the defendant's total possible
sentence. The defendant is indifferent as to whether the sentence is reduced on the charge to which he confesses or on another charge. He is
only concerned with the fact that by confessing he will reduce his total
time in prison. He is just as likely to confess falsely to obtain a reduction
in his sentence on another charge against him as he is to confess to
obtain a reduction in the sentence of the charge to which his confession
relates. In both situations he will be effectively deprived of his free
choice. The manner in which the promised benefit reaches the accused
has no relevance under the subjective test in determining the voluntariness
of the confession. The sole question should be whether the benefit
promised the accused was of sufficient strength to overcome his will,
not whether it related to the charge to which he confessed.
CONFESSIONS OBTAINED BY FRAUD, OR TRICKERY

The general rule in the federal courts as well as Indiana is that
confessions obtained by fraud or trickery are admissible unless the use
of such methods is reasonably likely to procure an untrue confession or
amount to mental coercion.56 In Lewis v. United States 7 a police officer
made a false statement to the accused as to evidence against him and
falsified a photograph supposedly showing his fingerprint upon the
shoe of the victim, thus tending to show the accused that the police had
strong evidence of his guilt. The accused thereupon confessed. The
court held that inducement of a confession by fraud or trickery does not
itself render the confession inadmissible. The court reasoned that while
false statements or trickery might tend to make a guilty man confess, they
would not have that tendency if the man were innocent unless the statement as to the evidence was coupled with some promise or representation
56.

United States ex. rel. Everett v. Murphy, 329 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Caminito

v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Jackson v. United States, 102 F. 473 (9th Cir.

1900) ; Schuble v. State, 226 Ind. 299, 79 N.E.2d 647 (1948).
3 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE § 841(1) (3d ed. 1940). "[T]he use of a trick or fraud
(however reprehensible in itself) does not of itself exclude a confession induced by
means of it. So far as the trick involved a promise which would tend to produce an
untrue confession, it would operate to exclude,-not, however, because it was a trick
(i.e. because the representations were false) but because even if true its tenor would
have stimulated a confession irrespective of guilt."
McCoR IcK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 232 (1954) "Procurement of a
confession by trick or deception does not vitiate it, unless the deception is calculated to
prompt the victim to confess falsely."

57. 74 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1934).
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in regard to the advantage to be gained by the confe;sion.
It is open to question whether the United States Supreme Court
would now uphold confessions obtained by trickery or fraud as meeting
the requirements of due process contained in the fourteenth amendment.
The above case indicates that the basis for admitting in evidence confessions obtained by fraud or trickery is not that they are considered
voluntary but that such confessions are likely to be true. An accused
will probably not confess under such circumstances unless he is guilty.
However, the guilt of the accused is not the overriding criterion for
determining the admissibilty of confessions. It is the method by which
confessions are obtained, not their reliability, which is now the determining factor."5
The United States Supreme Court has never clearly ruled that
any confession induced by fraud or trickery will render the confession
inadmissible. If the sole test for determining the admissibility of such
confessions is the subjective voluntariness of the accused, it is likely that
the tricks employed by the police in the Lewis case will not render the
confession inadmissible because of the lack of any mental coercion.
Although tricked, the accused's considerations in deciding to confess
were not clouded by extreme emotional pressures or coercion such as a
false threat to prosecute a friend as an accomplice. The facts in Spano v.
New York" provide an example of mental coercion which should render
the confession inadmissible under the test of subjiective voluntariness.
In that case, a police officer, under direction from his superior, told the
accused that he would be discharged from the police force and his wife
and children would suffer unless the accused confessed. Because of
sympathy for his friend, the accused did confess. A conviction based on
the confession was reversed because of all the surrotnding circumstances,
including lack of counsel. The Supreme Court later indicated that at
least part of the rationale for reversing the conviction was the trickery
employed by the police to elicit the confession.6"
Subjective voluntariness, however, is no longer the sole test for the
admissibility of confessions. In Escobedo6" the Court held a voluntary
5S. In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) tte United States Supreme
Court said: "Our decisions under that Amendment [fourteenth amendment] have made
clear that convictions following the admission into evidence of an involuntary confession
cannot stand. This is so not because such confessions are unlikely to be true but because
the methods used to extract them offend an underlying princicle in the enforcement of
our criminal law: that ours is an accusational and not an inqtuisitional system ..
59. 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
60. In Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) the court said: "This may fall
short of the crude chicanery of employing persons intimate with the accused, to play
upon his emotions, that was involved in Spaiw v. New York ..
61. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
confession inadmissible because of the deprivation of the accused's right
to counsel. As evidenced by that decision, the trend of the Court is
toward considerations of "fair play" and police ethics in ruling upon
the admissibility of a confession. The logical conclusion of this approach
is a ruling that all confessions obtained by unethical police methods such
as fraud and trickery are not admissible in evidence. This position is
supported by dictum in Lisenba v. California in which the Court stated:
"If, by fraud, collusion, trickery, and subornation of perjury, on the
part of those representing the state, the trial of an accused person results
in his conviction, he has been denied due process of law. The case can
stand no better if, by the same devices, a confession is procured and used
in the trial."2 The dictum of this case foreshadows a holding that all
confessions obtained by fraud or trickery are inadmissible in evidence
against the accused. The use of confessions obtained from the accused
by fraud or trickery as evidence lack the fairness and equity in legal
process which are commonly associated with and believed necessary to the
due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
THE SUBJECTIVE TEST OF VOLUNTARINESS AND ILLEGAL DETENTION

Under the Indiana statute on illegal detention an officer can not
legally hold an arrested person in custody for a longer period of time
than is reasonably necessary to obtain a proper order for his further
detention.6" Nevertheless, the Indiana courts have consistently held that
a confession is not rendered inadmissible because the accused has been
illegally detained in violation of this statute and has given the confession
during the period of illegal detention.6 4
There are federal statutes which require federal peace officers to
bring an arrested person promptly before a magistrate. 5 The McNabbMallory66 rule provides that a confession will be inadmissible in the
62. 314 U.S. 219 at 237 (1941). (Emphasis added.)
63. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-704(A) (Bums 1956): "When an officer arrests an
accused, either upon a warrant or for a misdemeanor committed within the view of the
officer or for a felony when the officer has cause to believe that such a crime has been
committed, he shall take the accused before the magistrate issuing the warrant, if a
warrant has been issued, or before the nearest magistrate if no warrant has been issued."
Sutter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1941). This case stated that a police
officer is liable for false imprisonment if he detains a person in violation of the statute.
64. Watts v. State, 226 Ind. 655 (1949) ; Kraus v. State, 229 Ind. 625, 100 N.E.2d
824 (1951).
65. 18 U.S.C. § 3001 (1958) 62 Stat. 638, ch. 645 (1948), FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a).
66. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) held that if federal officers
unnecessarily delay in bringing a defendant before a magistrate as required by federal
statute, any confession obtained from the defendant prior to his appearance before the
magistrate is inadmissible. In referring to the statute requiring federal officers to
promptly bring persons in their custody before a magistrate, the Supreme Court said in
318 U.S. at 346 "Congress has not expressly forbidden the use of evidence so procured.
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federal courts if it is obtained by federal officers who have failed to
bring the accused promptly before a magistrate. Indiana decisions have
held that the rule does not apply to the states because it is based on a
statute limiting the acts of federal officers and not on constitutional
doctrines applicable to the states.6" Although some Supreme Court
Justices have expressed the opinion that illegal detention of an accused
should render a confession inadmissible," the Urited States Supreme
Court has held that the McNabb-Mallory rule has no application to the
states and that a confession obtained by state law enforcement officials
during a period of illegal detention of the accused is not inadmissible
because of such detention.6"
This position of Indiana Courts and the United States Supreme
Court is not inconsistent with the subjective test of voluntariness. Illegal
detention is merely one of the factors to be considered in determining
whether the cumulative effect of all factors brought to bear upon the
accused was sufficient to impair his self-determination and overcome
his freedom of choice.
What effect will Escobedo v. Illinois70 have upon the above rule that
a confession is not inadmissible per se because given during a period of
illegal detention? This rule obviously is based upon the standard of
voluntariness as a test of admissibility of a confession; a confession is
But to permit such evidence to be made the basis of a conviclion in the federal courts
would stultify the policy which Congress has enacted into hw." Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957) reaffirmed the holding of the McNabb case.
67. Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117, 117 N.E.2d 362, 365 (1954): "But these
statutes are only a limitation on the acts of federal officers, aad have no application to
state rules of evidence. We have never held that the Indiana 3tatutes requiring that an
arrested accused be brought promptly into open court require a .-onfession to be excluded,
if it is not obtained in the violation of constitutional rights." Accord: Dowlut v. State
5 Ind. Dec. 171 (Lagrange Cir. Ct. 1964) ; Stevens v. State, 240 Ind. 19, 158 N.E.2d 784
(1959) ; Davis v. State, 235 Ind. 620, 137 N.E.2d 30 (1956) ; McClanhan v. State, 232
Ind. 567, 112 N.E.2d 575 (1953); Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 227, 1L N.E.2d 171, cert. denied,
304 U.S. 564 (1937).
68. The concurring opinion of Chief Justice Douglas in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 57 (1949) stated "The court should outlaw any confession obtained during a period
of unlawful detention of the accused. The procedure of unlawful detention breeds
coerced confessions. It is the procedure without which the inquitition would not flourish."
69. For example, in Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) a young Negro charged
with rape was intermittently questioned for ten days until he confessed. He was not
taken before the magistrate for a preliminary hearing until after his confession-ten
days after his arrest. Alabama law required an accused to be brought promptly before
a magistrate. While holding the confession to be involuntary, the Supreme Court stated
that while violation of a state statutory requirement that one accused of a crime be taken
before a magistrate without delay does not, as a matter of due process, compel rejection
of the confession obtained during the period of illegal deter tion; it is, nevertheless,
relevant circumstantial evidence in the inquiry as to physical Cr psychological coercion.
To the same effect is Stein v. New York, 346, 156 (1953). See, Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1331

(1951).

70. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
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not necessarily involuntary merely because it was given by the accused
while being illegally detained. It could be argued that Escobedo undermined the whole basis, the standard of voluntariness, since it departed
entirely from the standard of voluntariness and held the accused's confession to be inadmissible even though concededly voluntary. However,
the argument is not persuasive. In stressing the right to counsel in
Escobedo the Court decided only that where an accused has been deprived
of his right to counsel the confession will be inadmissible even though it
is voluntary. It did not say that voluntariness is no longer a legitimate
test of the admissibility of a confession under any circumstances, that is,
where there is no deprivation of the right to counsel. If police officials
illegally hold an accused incommunicado refusing his request to consult
with counsel, his confession would be inadmissible. The confession would
not be inadmissible because of the fact that it was given during the period
of illegal detention, but because of the denial of the accused's right to
counsel. However, if the accused waived his right to counsel, during the
period of illegal detention, the confession would be admissible, absent
circumstances demonstrating the confession to be involuntary. Thus, it
would appear that the Escobedo decision does not preclude the use of the
test of voluntariness in all circumstances nor require any change in the
traditional rule regarding the admissibility of confessions made by an
accused during a period of illegal detention. Few cases have considered
that question.

71

There is, however, a likelihood that the United States Supreme
Court will apply the McNabb-Mallory rule to the states in the future.
An indication of this may be found in Mapp v. Ohio7 and Wong Suln v.
United States." Mapp declared that evidence obtained by illegal search
or seizure is not admissible in evidence. It held that the use of such evidence-fruit of illegal conduct-is violative of due process guaranteed
to persons in the state courts by the fourteenth amendment. The Court
thus extended to the states a doctrine which had previously only been
applied in federal prosecutions.
Using this doctrine as its premise, the United States Supreme Court
71. The Supreme Court of Hawaii in the recent case of State v. Kitashiro, 397
P.2d 558 (Hawaii 1964) stated: "While Escobedo marks a shift in course, upon comparison with Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, Cicenia v. La Gay, 357 U.S. 504, Culombe
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, and Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 568, the point pertinent here is that emphasis was put upon the right to counsel. The McNabb-Mallory rule
was not extended to state cases. It remains the rule in this jurisdiction that a confession
obtained during unlawful delay between the arrest and the production of the accused
before a magistrate is not ipso facto inadmissible." Accord, Dowlut v. State, 5 Ind. Dec.
171 (Lagrange Cir. Ct. 1964).
72. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
73. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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in Wong Su held a confession given by the accused while under illegal
arrest to be inadmissible even though there was nc evidence that it was
involuntary. Federal narcotics agents had entered the home of the accused
without a search warrant, handcuffed him, and declared him under
arrest. The agents questioned him about the sale of heroin and told him
that he had been identified as a user of heroin. The accused thereupon
confessed to the use and possession of the narcotic. In holding the
confession inadmissible because it was obtained during an illegal seizure
of the accused, the Court reasoned that since physical evidence obtained
by unlawful search or seizure is inadmissible as fruits of unlawful
conduct, so should verbal evidence (a confession) be inadmissible when
derived from illegal seizure.
Since the United States Supreme Court in federal prosecution has
interpreted the rule excluding evidence obtained by way of illegal seizure
or search as embracing confessions as well as physical evidence, such as
stolen goods, it would not be surprising to find the Supreme Court, in
applying Mapp. v. Ohio to the states, holding that confessions obtained
during illegal arrest are inadmissible. Such an application of the McNabbMallory rule to the states would be a logical extension of the Supreme
Court's position as evidenced by Mapp v. Ohio and particularly Escobedo
v. Illinois.74
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL

The Indiana constitutional right of the accused to counsel contemplates his right to consult with counsel at every stage of the proceedings.7 In referring to the right to counsel, the court in Batchelor v.
State7 said: "Where a right is conferred by law, everything necessary
for its protection is also conferred, although not directly provided
for.

.

.

. To give life and effect to the provision of the Constitution

under consideration, it must be held to confer upon the relator every
privilege which will make the presence of counsel ur on the trial a valuable
right."77 Despite the sweeping language of Batchelor, it is the established
rule in Indiana that a confession is not excluded from evidence solely
74. Under facts similar to those in Wong Sun the In liana Supreme Court has
found the confession admissible. Rohlfing v. State, 230 Ind. 236, 102 N.E.2d 199 (1952).
But the Supreme Court in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) appears
to have departed from the voluntary test; in that case there w as no evidence of coercion
exercised upon the accused. In addition, the fact that tha guarantee against selfincrimination and the guarantee against illegal search and seizure are separate and
distinct constitutional provisions did not appear to concern the United States Supreme
Court in Wong Sun.
75. IND. CONST. art. 1 § 13; Sutter v. State, 227 Ind. 64:, 38 N.E.2d 386 (1949).
76. 189 Ind. 69, 125 N.E. 773 (1920).
77. Id. at 77, 125 N.E. at 776.
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because the accused was without counsel at the time of making the
confession.7

1

It is significant that in no case where the Indiana Supreme

Court held the lack of counsel not to invalidate the confession did the
accused request the assistance of counsel. A few cases have suggested
that the Indiana courts might hold a confession inadmissible where the
accused had requestd and been denied counsel.79
However, it would appear that under the subjective test Indiana
would not exclude a confession solely because the accused's request for
counsel has been denied. The fact that the accused has been denied his
constitutional right to consult with counsel does not by itself demonstrate
that the confession was not freely given by the accused. There is no
necessary relation between consultation with an attorney and the voluntary nature of the confession. If the voluntariness of a confession is the
test of its admissibility, then there is no reason for excluding it from
evidence solely because the accused has been denied his right to consult
with counsel. Such a denial should be merely one factor to be considered
in conjunction with other circumstances in determining whether a confession was a product of a free and unconstrained mind.
Indiana's application of voluntariness as the sole standard for the
admissibility of confessions has resulted in few restraints on police. It
is clear that a confession is admissible even though the accused does not
understand that he is entitled to the advice of a lawyer before making it."0
The accused's interrogators are not under any duty to advise him of his
right to counsel, or of his right to remain silent, or that anything he may
say may be used against him."' Nor do the police have an obligation to
provide the accused with an attorney. 2
Until recently it was recognized that a confession was not inadmissible in evidence solely because the accused had been denied the right
78. See, e.g., Britt v. State, 242 Ind. 556, 180 N.E.2d 235 (1962) ; Flowers v. State,

236 Ind. 158, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956); Kelley v. State, 231 Ind. 671, 110 N.E.2d 860
(1953) ; May v. State, 232 Ind. 523, 112 N.E.2d 439 (1953) ; Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind.
116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941).
79. Dearing v. State, 229 Ind. 131, 95 N.E.2d 832 (1951) ; Sutter v. State, 227 Ind.
648, 88 N.E.2d 386 (1949) ; Eiffee v. State, 226 Ind. 57, 77 N.E.2d 750 (1948) ; After
citing the Sutter and Dearing cases, the Lagrange Circuit Court in State v. Dowlut, 5
Ind. Dec. 171, 173 (1964) stated: "Neither of these cases assert unequivocally that a
failure to provide counsel upon demand will render the confession inadmissible per se.
However, it would be a most unusual case that would justify holding a confession ad-

rnissible if taken after counsel had been demanded and refused."
80. Britt v. State, 342 Ind. 556, 180 N.E2d 235 (1962) ; Kelley v. State, 231 Ind.
671, 110 N.E.2d 860 (1953).
81. Flowers v. State, 236 Ind. 158, 139 N.E.2d 185 (1956) ; Marshall v. State, 227
Ind. 1, 83 N.E.2d 763 (1949); Eiffee v. State, 226 Ind. 57, 77 N.E.2d 750 (1948);
Hawkins v. State, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941).
82. Marshall v. State, 227 Ind. 1, 83 N.E.2d 763 (1949); Hawkins v. State, 219
Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79 (1941).
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to counsel. The United States Supreme Court had stated that a refusal
to permit the accused to communicate with legal counsel does not by itself
render the confession inadmissible, but is merely one factor to be considered in the total situation in determining whether the confession was
voluntarily given.8 3 In Escobedo8" the United States Supreme Court ruled
that the defendant's confession of murder was inadmissible as evidence
against him, even though voluntarily given, because he had been denied
his right to consult with counsel. The Supreme Court now maintains,
that the voluntary nature of the confession is completely irrelevant where
the interrogators of the accused have denied him hi constitutional right
to counsel.8"
The as yet unresolved question is, under what circumstances a confession will be found inadmissible solely upon the basis of the accused's
lack of counsel at the time of his confession. This is a particularly
difficult question because of the special facts in the Escobedo case.
Escobedo was arrested by the police for the murder of his brother-in-law.
A suspect whom the police had previously arrested admitted involvement
in the murder and named Escobedo as the killer. The police interrogated
Escobedo urging him to confess because he had been named by his alleged
accomplice. Escobedo's mother had employed an attorney, who was at
the police station in an adjoining room while Escobedo was being interrogated. His requests to see Escobedo were denied. Escobedo's requests
to see his attorney were also denied. When the police confronted
Escobedo with his accomplice who pointed to Escobdo and said he had
fired the fatal shot Escobedo replied that he had not fired the shot, but
that the accomplice had. He thereby admitted participation in the crime.
This confession was later reduced to writing.
The Court held that: "Where the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry
out a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements, the suspect has requested and been deided an opportunity
to consult with, his counsel, and the police have not effectively warned
him of his absolute constitutionalright to remain silent, the accused has
been denied 'the assistance of counsel' in violation of the Sixth Amend83. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
84. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (5-4 Decision).
85. Id. at 495; This has been the dissenting position of the Court for sometime:
Dissenting opinion in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) by Justices Douglas, Black, and Brennan. Dissenting opinion in Cicenia v. L-gay, 357 U.S. 504, 511
(1958) by Justices Douglas and Black. Dissenting opinion in In Re Groban, 352 U.S.
330, 337 (1957) by Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan.
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ment which is obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
and no statement elicited by the police may be used against him at the
criminal trial." 6
The Supreme Court in Escobedo did not rule that a confession would
be inadmissible if the accused does not have counsel at the time of making
it even though he has not specifically requested such assistance. Its
holding was limited to the situation before it where the accused had
requested and been denied the assistance of counsel already retained on
his behalf. However, it appears that the import of this decision is that
a confession given by an acused while without the aid of counsel will be
inadmissible regardless of whether the accused has requested counsel,
87
unless the accused has waived his right to counsel.
Prior to Escobedo it was clear that an accused had a right to counsel
when judicial proceedings, such as arraignment, were taken against him,
but it was not settled whether he had a right to counsel prior to arraignment. Escobedo resolved this question. It is now clear that the defendant's right to counsel accrues at the time he is taken into custody
and the focus of inquiry centers upon him. 8 This ruling of Escobedo
viewed in the light of Carnleyv. Cochlrai s9 leads to the conclusion that the
accused need not request counsel. In Carnley the United States Supreme
Court stated: "[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a
constitutional requisite the right to be furnished counsel does not depend
on request.""0 In stressing the defendant's request for the aid of counsel
the Court in Escobedo did not say that such a request was necessary to
give rise to his right to counsel. Rather it treated his request for counsel
and denial of that request as evidence that the investigation had reached
the accusatory stage at which the right to counsel accrued. 9
86. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 491. (Emphasis added.)
87. The dissenting opinion of Justice White concurred in by justices Clark and
Stewart in stating this view said in Id. at 495: "Although the opinion purports to be
limited to the facts of this case, it would be naive to think that the new constitutional
right announced will depend upon whether the accused has retained his own counsel or
has asked to consult with counsel in the course of interrogation. At the very least the
court holds that once the accused becomes a suspect and, presumably, is arrested, any
admission made to police thereafter is inadmissible in evidence unless the accused has
waived his right to counsel."
88. Thus, where one freely walks into a police station and voluntarily admits his
guilt, his confession is not inadmissible because of the absence of counsel. Likewise,
where a defendant is one of several persons, such as the acquaintances of the victim,
questioned in a general investigation of a crime with no intent of eliciting a confession
from him, and he voluntarily confesses to the crime, his confession will be admissible.
89. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
90. Id. at 510.
91. The Court stated in 378 U.S. at 485: "The interrogation here was conducted
before the petitioner was formally indicted. But that should make no difference. When
the petitioner requested and was denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, the
investigation had ceased to be a general investigation of 'an unsolved crime.' The peti-
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The defendant's right to counsel should not depend upon a request
for legal assistance. A distinction based on whether or not the accused
requested counsel would treat the uninformed person as if he had no
right to counsel. An accused's right to the assistance of counsel should
not depend on his knowledge of that right. In addition, Escobedo refused
to recognize any artificial distinction between post and pre-arraignment
periods as affecting the time when the defendant's right to counsel
accrues; yet the distinction between the confession of the defendant who
specifically requests counsel and an uninformed one who submits no such
request would be an equally untenable artificiality. Thus, a confession
obtained from the accused when he is without the assistance of counsel
will probably be inadmissible regardless of whether he has specifically
requested counsel.92
A confession will not be excluded because of the absence of counsel
if the accused has waived his right to counsel. Escobedo made this clear.9"
However, the right to counsel is not waived unless it is intelligently and
understandingly waived. 4 An accused cannot realistically waive his right
to counsel if he is unaware that he is entitled to legal assistance. It follows
that the mere failure of the accused to request counsel cannot be construed
as a waiver of the right to counsel unless it is shown that he was aware
of that right. In Caruley the United States Supreme Court said: "Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must
show that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything less is not a waiver.""
The next question that arises from the ruling in, Escobedo is whether
the accused must be warned of his right to remain silent which is based
upon the fifth amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. This
problem will not arise where the defendant has the aid of counsel since
his attorney will advise him of his right to remain 3ilent and caution him
not to make any admissions. Is a confession iradmissible where the
accused has been advised of his right to counsel and waived that right,
tioner had become the accused and the purpose of the interrogation was to 'get him' to
confess his guilt despite his constitutional right not to do so."
92. Although there are as yet relatively few decisions irterpreting Escobedo, there
are several authorities which hold that an accused need not request counsel: Cruz v.
Delg-ado, 233 F. Supp. 944 (D.C. Puerto Rico, 1964) ; Wright v. Dickerson, 336 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1964) ; People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964) ; State v. Hall,
397 P.2d 261 (Idaho 1964) (concurring opinion) ; Russo v. N(w Jersey, 33 U.S.L. Week
June 1, 1965 2621 (3d Cir. 1965) ; State of Oregon v. Neely, 395 P.2d 557 (Ore. 1964)
State v. Dufour, 206 A.2d 82 (R.I. 1965).
93. "The accused may, of course, intelligently waive his -ight to counsel." 378 U.S.

478, 492 (1964).
94.

Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).

95. Id. at 514.
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but has not been advised of his constitutional right not to answer incriminating questions? There is authority to support the view that the defendant must be advised of both his right to counsel and his right to
remain silent." If the purpose of guaranteeing to a defendant the right to
counsel was merely to insure him of his right to silence, then it would be
plausible to argue that if the accused is advised of his right to counsel he
need not be advised of his right to remain silent and vice versa. Then if
he exercises his right to counsel, his attorney will advise him of his right
to silence and if he does not request counsel after being informed of that
right he will have waived both of these rights. However, this view is not
tenable. The right to silence is not merely an adjunct of the right to
counsel; the two rights are separable and distinct. The former is based
on the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and the latter
upon the sixth amendment. Escobedo stressed both the denial of counsel
and the failure to advise the defendant of his absolute right to remain
silent. The harm caused by the denial of counsel is depriving the defendant of an attorney's advice as to what statements it is safe for him
to make and what would be the legal effect of particular admissions he
may make; it is not the lack of a warning to the accused to say nothing.
This was stressed by the court in Escobedo as the core of the right to
counsel. The defendant stated that he had not fired the fatal shot but his
accomplice had. The court stated that the defendant was undoubtedly
unaware that an admission of complicity in a murder plot is as damaging
as an admission of firing the fatal shot. "The 'guiding hand of counsel'
was essential to advise the petitioner of his rights in this delicate
situaiton.

'9 7

The dissenting opinion in Escobedo supports the view that a confession is inadmissible if the defendant did not know of or was not
informed of his right to remain silent. It intimated that it would have
supported the majority decision if it were based upon such a rule. Justice
White, joined by two other Justices, stated: "The failure to inform an
accused that he need not answer and that his answers may be used against
him is very relevant indeed to whether the disclosures are compelled.
Cases in this court, to say the least, have never placed a premium on
ignorance of constitutional rights. If an accused is told he must answer
and did not know better, it would be very doubtful that the resulting
admissions could be used against him.""8 The constitutional right to
96.

See cases cited in note 92 supra. See also,
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TRAINING BULLETIN (No. 69, 1965).

97.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 486 (1964).

98.

Id. at 499. (Emphasis added.)
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remain silent should not depend upon knowledge of it any more than the
constitutional right to counsel. To hold that one not knowledgable of his
right to silence need not be informed of it is to treat him as if he had no
such right.
Must the police furnish the defendant with counsel during interrogation at the expense of the state? It would be invidious discrimination to
limit the right to counsel to defendants who are finarcially able to employ
their own counsel. Constitutional rights should not depend upon the
affluence of the defendant. This would be the effect if the Escobedo
decision were interpreted so that a defendant's right to counsel is not
violated when his request for counsel during interrogation is refused
because of his inability to pay or when, after being informed of his right
to counsel, he fails to request counsel because of his inability to pay.
The United States Supreme Court has said that in criminal trials
a state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account
of religion or race.D It also held that such discrimination violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendwrrent.1" ° These cases
referred to the denial of counsel to an indigent at the trial stage, but there
is no reason to believe that the accused's right to counsel during interrogation will be any more dependent upon his ability to pay than is his right
to counsel at the trial. It is reasonably clear that Escobedo in the light of
Powell v. Alabainma' and Gideon v. Wainwright..'will render the confession of an indigent defendant inadmissible if the state has not
furnished him legal counsel unless he has understandingly waived his
right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, in referring to the right to
counsel at the trial, held that the accused has the absolute right in all
criminal prosecutions to be represented by counsel and the right to have
counsel appointed for him if he is an indigent unless he completely waives
the right to counsel. As stated in Pewell v. Alabama the indigent defendant's right to have counsel appointed does not depend on a request
by him. The court also made clear that an indigent defendant's right
to the appointment of counsel would apply to any period during which
the presence of counsel is necessary to give effective aid in the preparation
and trial of the case. This period must surely embroce the interrogatory
stage during which a confession is elicited from the accused. The
Supreme Court in Escobedo characterized the interrogatory stage as the
critical period during which the accused is most in need of counsel. It
99. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 112 (1956).
100. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
101. 287 U.S. 45 (1937).

102. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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would be an irreconcilable departure from its rationale in Powell v.
Alabama and in Gideon v. Wainwright if the Supreme Court did not
hold it necessary that the indigent defendant have the right to the appointment of counsel for him during interrogation in order to give effect
to his right to counsel after interrogation.'
Likewise, it appears that Escobedo does not require the accused to
have counsel already retained. Such a requirement would again cause
his right to counsel to depend on his financial ability to employ counsel.
As previously' noted the Supreme Court rejects any such preconditions
as discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause. In addition,
the right would be limited to those few who have employed counsel in
anticipation of arrest, or who have had counsel employed by relatives
upon news of the arrest.
There have been several decisions in state courts upon Escobedo disagreeing with all of the above conclusions. They all appear to rest upon a
strict and literal construction which limits the rule of Escobedo to the
facts in that case. They have ruled that the accused must specifically
request the assistance of counsel and that he need not be advised of either
his right to counsel or of his right to remain silent." 4 The Supreme Court
of New Mexico has held that not only must the accused have requested
counsel, but he must have already retained an attorney." 5
It is clear that the Escobedo decision will produce changes in
Indiana's rules regarding the right to counsel. There has been only one
major Indiana case since Escobedo involving the right to counsel as
affecting the admissibility of confessions. In Hayden v. State' 1 the
Supreme Court of Indiana upheld a confession given by a fifteen-year-old
boy charged with purse-snatching and murder. The police twice advised
the accused of his right to counsel, but he failed to request legal assistance.
103. The Supreme Court stated in Escobedo v. Illinois 378 U.S. 478, 488 (1964)
after referring to Gideon v. Wainwright: "The rule sought 'by the State here, however,
would make the trial no more than an appeal from the interrogation; and the right to use
counsel at the formal trial would be a very hollow thing if, for all practical purposes, the
conviction is already assured by pre-trial examination. One can imagine a cynical prosecutor saying: 'Let them have the most illustrious counsel now. They can't escape the
noose. There is nothing that counsel can do for them at the trial.'"
104. See, e.g., United States v. Ogilvie, 334 F.2d 837 (7th Cir. 1964) ; Scamahorne
v. Commonwealth, 33 L.W. 2632 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 33
U.S.L. Week, June 1, 1965 2620 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Mass. 1965); Bean v. State, 33 U.S.L.
Week 2390 (Sup. Ct. Nev. 1965) ; People v. Hartgraves, 202 N.E.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. Ill.
1964) ; State v. Fox, 131 N.W.2d 684 (Sup. Ct. Iowa 1964) ; Anderson v. State, 205 A.2d
281 (Sup. Ct. Maryland 1964) ; Commonwealth v. Patrick, 206 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. Penn.
1964) ; Browne v. State, 131 N.W.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. Wisc. 1964) ; Turner v. State, 384
S.W.2d 879 (Sup. Ct. Texas 1964) ; State v. Vigliano, 43 N.J. 44, 202 A.2d 657 (1964);
Contra, see cases in note 92 supra.
105. Pece v. Cox, 396 P.2d 422 (S. Ct. of New Mex. 1964).
106. 201 N.E.2d 329 (Ind. 1964).
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The accused apparently was not warned of his right to remain silent.
The court concluded that the accused had waived hi3 right to counsel by
failing to request legal assistance after having been i'aformed of his right
to counsel, and thus, the confession was admissible because there was no
evidence that it was not voluntary. Since the court expressed no opinion
as to whether the defendant must specifically request counsel under
Escobedo or as to whether he must be advised of hi3 right to counsel or
of his right to silence, this case provides little insigIht as to how Indiana
0
will interpret Escobedo."'
It does not appear that the Escobedo decision completely precludes
all confessions nor vitiates the voluntary test as a standard for the admissibility of confessions obtained in the absence of counsel under all
circumstances. A confession is not rendered inadmissible because the
accused was without legal counsel at the time of making the confession
where he has intelligently waived his right to couns,!l. Where there has
been such a waiver, the admissibility of the confession is governed by the
subjective test of voluntariness. This is exemplified in Hayden where
the Indiana Supreme Court, after citing Escobedo, held the confession
admissible in the absence of any evidence indicating that it was not
voluntarily given since the accused had waived his right to counsel. Also,
it should be noted that under Escobedo the defendaat's right to counsel
does not accrue until the investigation centers upon him as the accused
and he is questioned for the purpose of eliciting a confession."
The Escobedo decision has been met with criticism, both within and
without the legal profession, and especially from law enforcement
officials. This is understandable since it makes a complete departure
from the rule universally honored by the courts for over a hundred years
that a confession is admissible if voluntary, despite the deprivation of
the accused's right to counsel. The rule announced in Escobedo certainly
makes the law enforcement officer's task more difficult. It has been
argued that the effect of giving the accused the right to consult with legal
counsel during interrogation will greatly reduce the number of confessions obtained by the police and thus undermine effective law enforcement, since any lawyer will advise his client to make no statement to the
107. But see, State v. Dowlut, 5 Ind. Dec. 171 (Lagrange Cir. Ct. 1964) where the
circuit court held that the waiver of the right to counsel by a seventeen-year-old defendant of above average intelligence was a nullity, since he was not taken before a
magistrate where a person trained in the law could explain in dtail his right to counsel
and since his waiver was made in the absence of consultation wifh any attorney or other
friendly person of mature judgment. The accused had been advised of both his right to
counsel and his right to remain silent, but he had stated that he did not desire legal
assistance.
108. See note 88 .supra.
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On the other hand it is said that the evidence for the state
police.'
would be more reliable and acceptable to jurors, thus providing a stronger
case, if it were independently secured by skillful investigation. If the
defendant is permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of
and exercise his constitutional right not to answer questions. But "...
if the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a
system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with
that system.""' A system of law enforcement certainly is not desirable
when its continued effectiveness depends upon the defendant's ignorance
of his constitutional rights. "
PROCEDURAL RULES IN THE TRIAL COURT AND ON APPEAL

In a pre-trial hearing in the absence of a jury, the judge determines
whether the confession was voluntarily given by the accused. The judge,
not the jury, determines the admissibility (voluntariness) of the confession."' This rule is in accord with that of the United States Supreme
Court. In Jackson v. Dennol" the United States Supreme Court ruled
that leaving the question of voluntariness to a jury violates the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment since, if the confession is
found to be involuntary but true, there will be no way of knowing
whether the jury has relied on the confession for its verdict. Where the
accused fails to object to the failure of the court to have a preliminary
hearing on the admissibility of the confession and fails to offer proof
of the incompetency of the confession, the accused waives any question
as to its admissibility. 3 ' A condition precedent to the admissibility of a
confession is that the state establish the corpus delicti by clear proof
independent of the confession. Proof of the corpus delicti means proof
that the specific crime charged has been committed by someone."' The
109. The decrease in the number of confessions obtained is asserted to be undesirable because: (1) the pre-Escobedo rules of exclusion adequately eliminate the dangers
of coercion so that admissible confessions are trustworthy; (2) confessions coming from
the accused are an invaluable source of information for the jury; (3) in many cases the
accused is the only witness to the crime and his testimony is the only source of first hand
information; (4) in combatting organized crime the confession of one member may provide invaluable identification of other members; and (5) confessions are often freely
given out of a sense of guilt immediately following the commission of a crime, and such
completely voluntary confessions should not be excluded. 38 So. CAL. L. REv. 156 (1965)
Note: "Right to Counsel During Police Interrogation," Larry Thrall.
110. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 492 (1964).
111. Sturgeon v. State, 237 Ind. 29, 143 N.E.2d 411 (1957) ; McGee v. State, 230
Ind. 429, 104 N.E.2d 726 (1952) ; Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1932) ;
Ogle v. State, 193 Ind. 187, 127 N.E. 547 (1920) ; Brown v. State, 71 Ind. 470 (1880).
112. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
113. Sturgeon v. State, 237 Ind. 25, 143 N.E.2d 411 (1957).
114. Brown v. State, 239 Ind. 206, 154 N.E.2d 720 (1959) ; Schlegel v. State, 238
Ind. 376, 150 N.E.2d 563 (1958) ; Hunt v. State, 235 Ind. 280, 133 N.E.2d 48 (1956) ;
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state need not prove all the facts stated in the corLfession but only the
corpus delicti, and it is not necessary to establish the corpus delicti beyond
a reasonable doubt. 15
The defendant has no right to the pre-trial inspection of an extrajudicial confession made by him. It is provided by statute in Indiana that
in all cases where no special provision is made in the criminal code, the
rules of pleading and practice in civil actions shall govern.11 The Indiana
civil code"' provides that the court may, under prol er restrictions, order
either party to give the other an inspection and copy of any book or part
thereof, paper or document in his possession, or under his control, containing evidence relating to the merits of the action or the defense therein.
There is no special provision in the criminal code governing the defendant's right to pre-trial inspection of his confession. Therefore, as
can be seen from the civil code the defendant has no absolute right to
pre-trial discovery of his confession but the grantin'Y of this privilege is
left to the court's discretion." 8 This rule has been held consistent with
the defendant's rights to due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. The United States Supreme Court held in Cicenicz v. Lagay"5. that
although it is the better practice for the prosecution to grant the accused's
attorney pre-trial inspection of the confession, the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment is not violated when the accused in a state court
is denied permission to inspect his confession prior to the trial. Also,
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure the accused in a federal
court has no right to inspect his confession prior to trial. 20
It appears that the accused should have the right under the fourteenth
amendment to inspect his confession prior to trial. Such a right is
necessary to the effectiveness of the accused's right to counsel. It is
important that the accused's attorney have an accurate knowledge of the
contents of the confession so that he can properly prepare his defense.'
111r. Justice Brennan has said, "To deny pre-trial disclosure of the defendant's statements is to shackle counsel so that he can not effectively
Simmons v. State, 234 Ind. 489, 129 N.E.2d 121 (1955) ; Dennii" v. State, 230 Ind. 210,
102 N.E.2d 650 (1952).
115. Holding v.State, 1 Ind. Dec. 347, 190 N.E.2d 660 (1963).
116. IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-2407 (Burns 1956).
117. IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-1645 (Burns 1956).
118. The Supreme Court inWeer v.State, 219 Ind. 217, 36 N.E.2d 787 (1941) held
that there is no absolute right to the production or extraction of papers held by the
prosecution but rests in the discretion of the court. Accord, Anderson v. State, 239 Ind.
272, 156 N.E.2d 384 (1959).

119. 357 U.S. 503 (1957).
120.
121.

United States v. Murray, 297 F.2d 812 (1962).
In Illinois the accused has a statutory right to pre-tri .l inspection of his confession. ILL. REv. STAT., ch. 38, § 114-10(a) (Smith-Hurd) (1963).
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seek out the truth and afford the accused the representation which is
not his privilege but his absolute right."' 2 Reasoning that the defendant's
right to counsel at trial would be of small utility if he did not possess
that right during interrogation, the Court in Escobedo held that a confession made without benefit of council is inadmissible under the fourteenth amendment. Likewise, the effectiveness of the defendant's right
to counsel at trial can be seriously impeded if his attorney does not have
access to his confession prior to trial. It thus appears that the defendant
should have the right to pre-trial discovery of his confession in order
fully to effectuate his right to counsel at trial.
Confessions are prin facie admissible, and the accused has the
burden of proving them inadmissible, that is, involuntary.'
"A confession by a person accused of crime is presumed to be voluntarily made
until the contrary is shown."' 2 4 This is a tremendous burden upon an
accused since ordinarily it will merely be his word against that of the
police officials. Usually an accused can not prove the involuntary nature
of a confession unless he can show physical signs of mistreatment such as
bruises, cuts, fractured bones, etc. Even then he has the difficult task
of showing that these were inflicted by the police. It is seldom that an
accused can offer proof sufficient to rebut the presumption that the
confession was voluntarily given. Under Escobedo there will be no
problem of proof since the accused's attorney will be available to testify
as to any coercion that may be applied to obtain a confession. In fact,
coercion and most likely the confession itself will be eliminated by the
presence of counsel since the police will not engage in questionable
practices in the presence of counsel. But even if the accused is denied
counsel, he is still in a much better position since Escobedo seems to have
shifted the burden of proof onto the state. It requires the exclusion of
the confession where the accused was not represented by counsel during
the interrogation unless he waived his right to counsel. The burden of
proof is upon the state to show that the accused waived his right to
122. Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963
WAsH. U.L.Q. 279, 287. The Supreme Court of Bronx County, New York in People v.
Quarles, 255 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1965), after reviewing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), Messiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) held that the defendant is entitled as a matter of right to pre-trial inspection
of his confession.
123. Matthews v. State, 239 Ind. 254, 156 N.E.2d 387 (1959); Pierce v.
State, 236 Ind. 545, 141 N.E.2d 109 (1957) ; Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d
362 (1954) ; Schuble v. State, 226 Ind. 299, 79 N.E.2d 647 (1948) ; Caudill v. State, 224
Ind. 531, 69 N.E.2d 549 (1946).
124. Thurman v. State, 169 Ind. 240, 82 N.E. 64 (1907).
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counsel; it is not upon the accused to disprove a waiver." 5 Once it
proves the defendant was informed of his right to counsel and declined
that right, then the defendant has the burden of proving that he knowingly waives that right.
As a necessary and obvious corollary to the presumption of voluntariness of confessions, the accused has the right 1-o show under what
circumstances the confession was made before it is admitted as eviHowever, if he does not make a reasonable objection to the
dence.'
admission of the confession, the accused will be considered to have waived
his right to challenge the voluntariness of the confession." 7
If the judge determines that the confession - as voluntarily given
by the accused and admits it as evidence, the accused has the right to
present evidence to the jury to contradict or discredit the confession. 2
The judge may admit the confession as evidence in whole or in part,
but where only a part of the confession is admitted the accused has the
right to introduce the whole statement made by him."2
Neither Indiana nor the United States Supreme Court will review
a trial court's determination of issues of fact. If tl-e accused was given
an opportunity to prove the inadmissibility of his confession, an appellate
court will not disturb the trial court's determination of the admissibility
of the confession where there is conflicting evidence as to the voluntariness of confession. It will overrule a lower court's determination only if
it is clearly erroneous."' Obviously, the trial court is in the best position
to evaluate all of the conflicting evidence and to decide whether the
confession was voluntary."' As was made clear in Watts v. Idiana,"'
all matters which are issues of fact are for conclusive determination by
state courts and will not be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court.
However, the United States Supreme Court will review the state
court's determination as to whether a confession given under facts de125. The United States Supreme Court stated in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506
(1962) that every presumption is indulged in against the waiver of a constitutional right.
such as the right to counsel, and the burden of proving a waiver of the right to counsel
is upon the state.
126. McGee v. State, 230 Ind. 429, 104 N.E.2d 726 (1952) ; Krauss v. State, 229

Ind. 630, 100 N.E.2d 824 (1951).

127. Hansbrough v. State, 228 Ind. 688, 94 N.E.2d 534 (1950).
128. McGee v. State, 230 Ind. 429, 104 N.E.2d 726 (1952) ; Krauss v. State, 229
Ind. 630, 100 N.E.2d 824 (1951) ; Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 180 N.E. 279 (1932).
129. Mack v. State, 203 Ind. 355, 374 (1932).
130. Shipman v. State, 243 Ind. 245, 183 N.E.2d 823 (1962) ; Britt v. State, 242 Ind.
548, 180 N.E.2d 235 (1962) ; Matthews v. State, 239 Ind. 252, 156 N.E.2d 387 (1958) ;

Pearman v. State, 233 Ind. 111, 117 N.E.2d 362 (1954) ; Hicks v. State, 213 Ind. 277, 11
N.E.2d 171 (1937).

131. Hauk v. State, 148 Ind. 238, 47 N.E. 465 (1897).
132. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
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termined by the trial court was secured in violation of the accused's
rights under the Constitution. Thus, if the accused contends that he was
continuously questioned until exhausted, deprived of adequate food and
sleep, etc., the United States Supreme Court will accept as conclusive the
state court's determination as to whether these facts were present; but
it will review the state court's determination as to whether such facts
rendered the confession involuntary.
Unlike the United States Supreme Court, the Indiana Supreme
Court will not review the trial court's determination of the voluntariness
of the confession if there are reasonable grounds for that decision. Thie
state courts are free to promulgate any reasonable rules for review, and
these rules need not coincide with those of the United States Supreme
Court. The rule adopted by the Indiana Supreme Court is apparently not
unreasonable. In fact the United States Supreme Court applies a similar
rule in its review of the decisions of the various federal agencies. It will
not review any decision of a federal agency, such as the Federal Trade
Commission, unless that decision is clearly unsupported by the facts.i3
In Watts v. Iizdiana' the United States Supreme Court stated that
a coerced confession is inadmissible even though the statements in it
may be independently established as true. This rule indicates that no
portion of a confession obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights is admissible against him. But the practice in Indiana as
well as in most states is contrary. Upon retrial of Watts after his confession had been ruled involuntary by the United States Supreme Court,
the Indiana Supreme Court in Watts v. State35 ruled that although the
confession, as a whole, was not admissible, it was not error for the trial
court to admit the accused's admission in the illegal confession divulging
the hiding place of the murder weapon, nor was it error to admit the
gun found by. the police from information in the confession since the
gun was proved to have been the lethal weapon. Although Indiana will
not allow the whole of an illegal confession to be used in evidence against
the accused, it has consistently admitted in evidence admissions from it
if proved true independent of the confession." 8
133. 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (a) (5) (1958); 60 Stat. 243, ch. 324, § 10 (1946).
134. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
135. 229 Ind. 80, 95 N.E.2d 570 (1950).
136. In McCoy v. State, 241 Ind. 104, 170 N.E.2d 43 (1960) the accused's confession divulged the whereabouts of radios stolen by him. The Court admitted the stolen
radios in evidence relying upon Watts v. State (1950).
The same result was
reached upon similar facts in Dunbar v. State, 177 N.E.2d 452 (1962). In Temple
v. State, 195 N.E.2d 850, 2 Ind. Dec. 656 (1964) the court stated that even if the
statement by the defendant as to the whereabouts of the coat worn in the robbery was
made as part of an illegally obtained confession to the crime of robbery, the statement is
admissible and the coat itself is admissible in evidence if it is established independent of
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Wharton and Wigmore note that at common law, the exclusion of
an involuntary confession was based solely on its unreliability. 37 Courts
therefore adopted the rule that physical evidence discovered by coercing
information from the accused is admissible since it is not subject to the
objection of unreliability. 38 Permitting statements from an inadmissible
confession to be used in evidence against the accused if independently
proved also appears to be based upon the reliability rationale.
It is difficult to perceive why portions of a coerced confession should
be admissible because independently proved to be reliable but not the
whole confession if also independently proved reliable. Neither the illegal
confession in toto nor admission from it should bc allowed in evidence
against the accused even if proved to be true indpendent of the confession. It is as much a denial of due process of law to allow admissions
obtained in violation of the accused's constitutional rights to be used
against him as it is to use the whole confession even though independently
established as true. In both instances he is compelled to give evidence
against himself in contraveniton of the guarantee of the fifth amendment
against self-incrimination.
The rationale of reliability is no longer valid, for the United States
Supreme Court held in Richmond v. Rogers that the use of coercive
methods, not the lack of trustworthiness, is the basis for the due process
requirement that involuntary confessions be excltded from evidence.
Thus, it is the manner in which evidence is obtained from the accused,
not its reliability, that determines whether it may be used against the
accused. Therefore, although the United States Stpreme Court has not
yet decided the precise question in regard to state proceedings, it appears
almost certain that it would hold the accused's procedural due process
rights violated if statements from an excluded confession or physical
evidence secured as a direct result of information in the confession are
admitted in evidence against the accused even though such evidence is
proved true independent of the confession. 4 '
the confession that it was worn during the time of the robbery The robbery victim had
identified the defendant's coat as that worn by the robber. I Dowlut v. State, 5 Ind.
Dec. 171 (Lagrange Cir. Ct. 1964) in a confession of murder illegally obtained from the
defendant, he divulged the hiding place of the gun. The court held that the gun could
be admitted in evidence if the state proved by evidence independent of the confession that
the gun was the lethal weapon.
137. 3 NVIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823 (3d ed. 1940) ; 2 WHA.iTON, CRImI.AL EVIDENCE
§ 678 (10th ed. 1955).
13S. WIGIO , op. cit. szpra note 137 at §§ 856-858.
139. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
140. Since physical evidence acquired as a result of an illegally obtained confession
would most likely be inadmissible, can the converse be said? Would a confession be inadmissible if it is obtained as the result of an illegal seizure of physical evidence as where
a confession is induced by the display to the accused of evidence illegally seized which
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The above rules of procedure, as presently declared by the Indiana
courts, are based upon the premise that all confessions are admissible
if not involuntary. They are presumed to be voluntary until the accused
has shown otherwise. In many situations these rules would now be inapplicable because of the recent Escobedo decision which makes the voluntariness of the confession irrelevant where the accused hac been denied
the right to counsel. Thus, these rules of procedure would only be applicable where the accused has waived his right to counsel. In other
words, it is only where there is such a waiver that the standard of
voluntariness continues as c6ntrolling consideration.
CONCLUSION

Escobedo v. Illinois has already revolutionized the law of extrajudicial confessions. It appears that once the investigation has centered
upon a person as the accused for the purpose of eliciting a confession
from him, any extrajudicial confession given by him while without legal
counsel can not be used in evidence against him even though it is voluntary unless the state can show that he intelligently waived his right to
counsel. The subjective test of voluntariness as the standard for determining the admissibility of confessions is inapplicable unless at the time
the confession is given either the investigation had not centered upon the
defendant as the accused or he had waived his right to counsel. This
seems to be a narrow area within which the standard of voluntariness remains operative.1 4'
incriminates him in the crime? The New York Court of Appeals has held that a confession so obtained is inadmissible under the United States Supreme Court decision in
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). The Court in People v. Rodriquez, 11 N.Y.2d 279,
183 N.E.2d 651 (1962) reasoned that Mapp v. Ohio renders inadmissible not only items
obtained by illegal search or seizure, but any evidence which stems from their use. This
decision appears to be a very broad extension of the doctrine of Mapp v. Ohio. It would
not appear that the confession so obtained is a direct result of illegal search or seizure;
it is at most an indirect consequence of illegal search or seizure.
141. It should be noted that the "Judges Rules" in England present an alternative
to the complicated situation posed by Escobedo. Under these rules, statements of a
person in police custody are inadmissible in evidence against him if made in response to
questions put to him by police officials unless he has been properly cautioned. Before
questioning a person the police must effectively warn him of his rights, such as his right
to remain silent, and must caution him that anything he says will be reduced to writing
and used in evidence against him. Under the "Judges Rules," police officials are also
required to caution persons in their custody who wish to volunteer statements. These
rules are much simpler and easier to enforce than the law under Escobedo. Under them
it is unnecessary to determine whether the investigation has focused upon the person in
custody as the accused for the purpose of eliciting a confession from him. In contrast to
the Escobedo situation, there is no doubt under these rules whether a person in police
custody must be advised of all of his constitutional rights. It is suggested that the
"Judges Rules" are preferable to the complexities and uncertainties presented by the
recent Escobedo decision. See 3 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 847 (3d ed. 1940) for a discussion of "Judges Rules."

EXTRA JUDICIAL CRIMINAL CONFESSION
The McNabb-Mallory rule may be applied to the states in the
future. 42 However, such an extension of this rule may no longer be
necessary for the protection of the accused due to the broad right to
counsel given to him by Escobedo. The major evil of incommunicado
detention is that the accused is isolated from all persons who might advise
him as to his constitutional rights and provide him with moral support
in his confrontation with police officials. Under Escobedo the accused
has the right to consultation with legal counsel who will advise him of
his right to silence and caution him to admit nothing. If a defendant is
held in incommunicado detention, any confession obtained from him
during such detention will be inadmissible under Escobedo bccause of the
denial of his right to counsel.
The Indiana rule based on the standard of voluntariness, which puts
upon the accused the burden of proving his confession inadmissible, has
been vitiated except where there is knowledgable waiver making the
voluntary standard still applicable. Now the burden of proof is upon the
state. If the defendant was without legal counsel prior to his confession,
the confession will be inadmissible unless the state can prove that the
defendant waived his right to counsel. It further appears that the rule
of the Indiana courts which admits in evidence admissions from an
inadmissible confession and physical evidence ottained as result of
information in the inadmissible confession, but not the confession in toto,
is not consonant with the requirements of the due process of law in the
fourteenth amendment. 43
142. See note 72 supra and accompanying text.
143. See note 137 supra and accompanying text.

